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Abstrat
Reating against the limitation of statistis to deision proedures, R. A. Fisher proposed
for indutive reasoning the use of the duial distribution, a parameter-spae distribution of
epistemologial probability transferred diretly from limiting relative frequenies rather than
omputed aording to the Bayes update rule. The proposal is developed as follows using the
ondene measure of a salar parameter of interest. (With the restrition to one-dimensional
parameter spae, a ondene measure is essentially a duial probability distribution free of
ompliations involving anillary statistis.)
A betting game establishes a sense in whih ondene measures are the only reliable infer-
ential probability distributions. The equality between the probabilities enoded in a ondene
measure and the overage rates of the orresponding ondene intervals ensures that the
measure's rule for assigning ondene levels to hypotheses is uniquely minimax in the game.
Although a ondene measure an be omputed without any prior distribution, previ-
ous knowledge an be inorporated into ondene-based reasoning. To adjust a p-value or
ondene interval for prior information, the ondene measure from the observed data an
be ombined with one or more independent ondene measures representing previous agent
opinion. (The former ondene measure may orrespond to a posterior distribution with fre-
quentist mathing of overage probabilities.) The representation of subjetive knowledge in
terms of ondene measures rather than prior probability distributions preserves approximate
frequentist validity.
Keywords: artiial intelligene; betting; oherene; ondene distribution; expert system; foun-
dations of statistis; indutive reasoning; interpretation of probability; mahine learning; personal
probability; prior eliitation; subjetive probability
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1 Introdution
Within the history of frequentism, the preeminent preedent for basing indutive inferenes diretly
on hypothesis probabilities is that found in duial arguments of the mature Fisher (Barnard,
1987; Zabell, 1992; Edwards, 1992; Efron, 1998; Fraser, 2006), who objeted as staunhly against
the behavioristi theory of Neyman and Pearson as against the Bayesian theories of Laplae and
Jereys (Fisher, 1960; 1973). Several interpretations of duial inferene have been advaned.
For example, Haking (1965) attempted to justify it in terms of a derivation of logial parameter
probabilities from statistial overage rates under a priniple of irrelevane dened in terms of
onditional independene (Sharma, 1980). Fiduial-like arguments are now employed in the ontext
of funtional models (e.g., Kohlas, 2008) and generalized inferene (e.g., Hannig, 2009). The ontext
of the present study is that of an intelligent agent formulating a probabilisti level of ertainty of a
hypothesis on the basis of observed data and possibly on the basis of more subjetive information
as well.
A signiane funtion is a umulative distribution funtion (CDF) of a probability distribution
alled a ondene measure, whih is equivalent to a duial probability measure if anillarity
onsiderations are negleted. The ondene measure suintly inludes all the information needed
to ompute any ondene intervals or p-values of any null hypotheses for a single salar parameter
of interest. As will be seen, suh ombination methodology allows the utilization of one or more
subjetive probability distributions of that parameter without forfeiting frequentist validity. As in
strit Bayesian inferene, eah subjetive distribution represents the knowledge of some expert or
other intelligent agent, allowing the prinipled inorporation of existing information into an analysis
of observed data. The use of suh information in a frequentist framework in the ase of a salar
parameter of interest is made possible by reent methodology for ombining signiane funtions,
originally intended for the meta-analysis of independent data sets (Singh et al., 2005).
1.1 Condene measures
An observed sample x ∈ Ω of n observations is modeled as a realization of the random quantity
X of probability distribution Pξ, where ξ is the value of the parameter of some family of distribu-
tions. Letting θ = θ (ξ) ∈ Θ denote the subparameter of interest and γ = γ (ξ) ∈ Γ the nuisane
subparameter, 〈θ, γ〉 is written in plae of ξ without loss of generality.
Denition 1 (Signiane funtion). The funtion
F : Ω×Θ→ [0, 1]
is a signiane funtion for θ = θ (ξ) if
F (x, •) = Fx (•) : Θ→ [0, 1]
is a umulative distribution funtion (CDF) for all x ∈ Ω and if
P〈θ,γ〉 (FX (θ) < α) = α (1)
for all θ ∈ Θ, γ ∈ Γ, and α ∈ [0, 1].
The ondition of equation (1) says that FX (θ) is a pivotal quantity with a uniform distribution
on [0, 1] .
The signiane funtion enodes a rih set of ondene intervals, as follows.
Lemma 2. If F is a signiane funtion with inverse funtion F−1 : Ω× [0, 1]→ Θ, then
P〈θ,γ〉
(
θ ∈
(
F−1X (α1) , F
−1
X (1− α2)
])
= 1− α1 − α2 (2)
for all θ ∈ Θ, γ ∈ Γ, and α1, α2 ∈ [0, 1] suh that α1 + α2 ≤ 1. Conversely, onsider the funtion
F−1 : Ω× [0, 1] → Θ suh that F−1x is an inverse CDF for all x ∈ Ω. If equation (2) holds for all
θ ∈ Θ, γ ∈ Γ, and α1, α2 ∈ [0, 1] suh that α1+α2 ≤ 1, then F : B×Ω→ [0, 1], the inverse of F−1,
is a signiane funtion.
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The straightforward proof is omitted. The signiane funtion provides standard one- and
two-sided p-values for testing the null hypothesis that θ = θ′ as well as exat (1− α1 − α2) 100%
ondene intervals. A test against the alternative hypothesis θ > θ′, θ < θ′, or θ 6= θ′ re-
spetively yields FX (θ
′), 1 − FX (θ′), or 2FX (θ′) ∧ 2 (1− FX (θ′)) as the p-value (Fraser, 1991;
Shweder and Hjort, 2002).
The signiane funtion is used to generate a probability measure of the interest parameter:
Denition 3 (ondene measure). Consider F , a signiane funtion for θ. For all x ∈ Ω, if Fx
is the CDF of a random quantity ϑ that has some probability distribution P x on the measurable
spae (Θ,B), then P x is the ondene measure of θ that orresponds to F given X = x.
Efron (1993) dubbed P x a ondene distribution, the term Shweder and Hjort (2002) and
Singh et al. (2005) instead attahed to F due to the isomorphism noted below. To avoid onfusion
between the probability measure and its CDF, F is herein alled the signiane funtion, following
Fraser (1991). For larity, the emphasis will be on the probability distribution rather than on
the signiane funtion sine ondene measures take the plae of Bayesian prior and posterior
measures. The idea of a ondene distribution goes as far bak as Cox (1958), who reommended
the simultaneous onsideration of ondene intervals for multiple levels of ondene. Polansky
(2007), referring to P x probabilities as attained or observed ondene levels, provides an aessible
introdution to the onept and its appliations.
The onnetion between a ondene measure and suh ondene intervals is diretly made in
this statement that the inferential probability that ϑ is in a partiular observed ondene interval
is equal to the overage rate of the random ondene interval that it realizes.
Lemma 4. Given a random quantity ϑ that has some ondene measure P x on (Θ,B) orrespond-
ing to F given X = x,
1− α1 − α2 = P
x
(
ϑ ∈
(
F−1x (α1) , F
−1
x (1− α2)
])
(3)
= P〈θ,γ〉
(
θ ∈
(
F−1X (α1) , F
−1
X (1− α2)
])
(4)
for all x ∈ Ω, θ ∈ Θ, γ ∈ Γ, and α1, α2 ∈ [0, 1] suh that α1 + α2 ≤ 1.
Proof. Exat frequentist overage at rate 1− α1 − α2 follows from Lemma 2. That rate is equal to
the parameter-spae probability given X = x:
1− α1 − α2 = Fx
(
F−1x (1− α2)
)
− Fx
(
F−1x (α1)
)
= P x
(
ϑ ≤ F−1x (1− α2)
)
− P x
(
ϑ < F−1x (α1)
)
.
This result will be generalized to arbitrary ondene sets in Setion 2.1.2.
A ondene measure an be onstruted from any signiane funtion:
Lemma 5. Given some signiane funtion F , there is a random quantity ϑ of a ondene
measure P x that orresponds to F given X = x suh that, for all θ ∈ Θ and x ∈ Ω,
Fx (θ) = P
x (ϑ < θ) . (5)
Proof. For all x ∈ Ω, onsider a funtion P˜ x : B → [0, 1] that satises P˜ x ((θ′, θ′′]) = Fx (θ′′)−Fx (θ′)
for all θ′, θ′′ ∈ Θ suh that θ′ ≤ θ′′. By the Caratheodory extension theorem (e.g., Shervish,
1995, pp. 578-581 or Kallenberg, 2002, pp. 26-27), there is a measure spae (Θ,B, P x) suh that
P˜ x (Θ′) = P x (Θ′) for all Θ′ ∈ B. Then P x is a ondene measure orresponding to F given X = x
with the random quantity ϑ : Θ→ Θ.
Thus, every signiane funtion evaluated at X = x is isomorphi to a ondene measure.
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1.2 Intelligent agents
For the sake of larity and lose ontat with atual problems of statistial data analysis, deision-
theoreti results will be presented in familiar terms of estimation rather than solely in terms of
abstrat deision makers. It is nonetheless often expedient to refer to suh hypothetial agents to
plae the present work in ontext with the literature sine many have found it onvenient to imag-
ine an ideally information-proessing agent suh as the robot of Carnap (1971), espeially when
motivating axiomati deision theory and its game-theoreti preursors (2.2.1). While algorith-
mi agents in artiial intelligene often make real deisions, agents in statistis instead inform
a researher or administrator who will onsider the data analysis results and their underlying as-
sumptions when making a deision that annot be ompletely automated. To avoid onfusion with
atual people, pronouns and possessives referring to agents will be neuter.
1.3 Overview
Setion 2 establishes properties of ondene measures that both motivate their use and guide their
subjetive assignment. Various denitions and lemmas of Setions 1.1 and 2.1 provide a framework
for the aounts of oherene in Setion 2.2 and for a game-theoreti attribute of the ondene
measure that gives preise, general ontent to the following reasoning. Kempthorne (1976, p. 224)
onsidered fair odds for betting on the hypothesis that an observed ondene interval overs the
parameter value to be a funtion of the rate of frequentist overage ρ as if he were using a ondene
measure P x, laiming that suh a betting strategy would outperform a Bayesian, oherently wrong
strategy. Heuristially, the thought is that in assessing a fair betting rate, ahieving a reported
frequeny of orret deisions over repeated sampling outweighs the importane of oherene over
time; f. Robins and Wasserman (2000). The rational omponent of Kempthorne's assertion had
been formally speied in terms of minimizing risk under a simple loss funtion (Corneld, 1969).
That risk is generalized to a risk assoiated with testing arbitrary hypotheses in Setion 2.3, whih
establishes that the only minimax solutions are ondene measures.
Setion 3 turns to the speial ase of subjetive ondene measures as dened in Setion 3.1. A
strategy of ombining ondene measures, inluding one of more subjetive measures, is proposed
in Setion 3.2. Guidane on the assignment of subjetive ondene measures is then given in Setion
3.3. Subjetive ondene may be assigned to hypotheses (1) indiretly by means of a hypothetial
data set on whih the agent might rest its opinion, (2) diretly on the basis of minimaxity or other
frequentist properties of the ondene measure, or (3) indiretly by transforming a Bayesian prior
distribution into a ondene measure.
The paper onludes with a brief disussion.
2 Properties of ondene measures
Setions 2.2 and 2.3 respetively reord oherene and deision-theoreti riteria met by ondene
measures using the terminology introdued in Setion 2.1.
2.1 Condene-based estimation
Setion 2.1.2 treats the problem of deriving a subset Θˆ (x) of the parameter set Θ that has a desired
level of ondene or rate of overage ρ; the set Θˆ (x) is alled a set estimate to distinguish it from
a point estimate suh as that of Setion 2.1.1.
2.1.1 Hypothesis indiator estimation
The degree to whih a hypothesis is onsidered supported by data is dened as a point estimate of
the value indiating whether the hypothesis is true:
Denition 6. A funtion
1ˆ : B × Ω→ [0, 1] (6)
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is alled an indiator estimator on B × Ω. For all θ ∈ Θ, Θ′ ∈ B, and x ∈ Ω, the value 1ˆ (Θ′, x),
hereafter written as 1ˆΘ′ (x) , is an estimate of 1Θ′ (θ) .
Remark 7. This agrees with the interpretation of inferential or logial probability as an estimate
of the truth value of its hypothesis (e.g., Wilkinson, 1977; Jerey, 1986). However, the denition
is general enough to inlude in priniple any funtion from B × Ω to R1 by use of a monotoni
transform to the onventional [0, 1] range.
Evaluating the indiator estimator under squared error loss, Hwang et al. (1992) found that
F• (θ
′) and 1 − F• (θ
′) are admissible estimators of 1(inf Θ,θ′) (θ) and 1(θ′,supΘ) (θ), respetively, in
the ase of exponential models, with θ as the loation parameter. The resulting squared-error
admissibility of P • (ϑ < θ′) as an estimator of 1(inf Θ,θ′) (θ) is a weak ondition satised by all
generalized Bayes rules (Hwang et al., 1992) regardless of their atual frequentist performane.
2.1.2 Set estimation
In order to lay the groundwork for the minimax result of Setion 2.3, a general set estimator is
dened in terms of the general indiator estimator in the same way as ondene intervals are often
dened in terms of p-values. Let λ denote the Lebesgue measure on R1 and B ([0, 1]) the Borel
σ-eld of [0, 1] .
Denition 8. A funtion Θˆ : B ([0, 1]) × Ω → B is a set estimator and, if the map Θˆ• (x) :
B ([0, 1]) → B is bijetive for all x ∈ Ω, then Θˆ is an invertible set estimator. Further, Θˆ is the
set estimator orresponding to an indiator estimator 1ˆ on B × Ω if Θˆ is a set estimator and if
1ˆΘˆB(x) (x) = λ (B) for all x ∈ Ω. Eah observed ΘˆB (x) is a set estimate; λ (B) is the level or
nominal probability of a partiular set estimator ΘˆB with index B in B ([0, 1]).
The ondene oeient and Bayesian redibility are examples of the level λ (B) of a parti-
ular set estimator. Eah set B in B ([0, 1]) is used to index a partiular set estimator in order to
failitate working with
{
ΘˆB : B ∈ B ([0, 1])
}
, a omprehensive olletion of partiular set estima-
tors orresponding to the same indiator estimator. This proves more onvenient than indexing
partiular set estimators with their levels sine the same level an orrespond to multiple partiular
set estimators. For example, the lower-tail (B = [0, 0.95)), upper-tail (B = (0.05, 1]), and entral
(B = (0.025, 0.975)) 95% Bayesian redibility intervals represent three partiular set estimators,
eah of the same level, 95%. Sine B is a Borel set and sine λ is the Lebesgue measure on R1, less
usual indies suh as B = (0.05, 0.10)∪ (0.50, 0.99) are also possible.
The following lemma and theorem are also needed for the game-theoreti result of the next
setion.
Lemma 9. Suppose there are some signiane funtion F and indiator estimator 1ˆ on B × Ω
suh that
1ˆ(θ′,θ′′] (x) = Fx (θ
′′)− Fx (θ
′) , (7)
for all θ′, θ′′ ∈ Θ suh that θ′ ≤ θ′′ and for all x ∈ Ω. If ΘˆB : B ([0, 1])×Ω→ B is an invertible set
estimator orresponding to 1ˆ, then
λ (B) = P〈θ,γ〉
(
θ ∈ ΘˆB (X)
)
(8)
for all B ∈ B ([0, 1]), θ ∈ Θ and γ ∈ Γ. Conversely, if there is an invertible set estimator Θˆ :
B ([0, 1])×Ω→ B orresponding to an indiator estimator 1ˆ on B ×Ω suh that equation (8) holds
for all B ∈ B ([0, 1]), θ ∈ Θ, and γ ∈ Γ, then there is some signiane funtion F suh that 1ˆ
satises equation (7) for all θ′, θ′′ ∈ Θ suh that θ′ ≤ θ′′ and for all x ∈ Ω.
Proof. Aording to Lemma 2, exat overage (8) holds for every set estimator ΘˆB (X) that maps
to an interval subset of B. To prove exat overage of every set estimator ΘˆB (X) that maps to a
union of disjoint interval subsets of B, note that ΘˆB′ (x) is the subset of ΘˆB (x) orresponding to
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subset B′ of B for some x ∈ Ω aording to the invertibility of Θˆ. With B ([0, 1])′ (B) denoting the
set of all disjoint interval subsets of B,
P〈θ,γ〉
(
θ ∈ ΘˆB (X)
)
=
∑
B′∈B([0,1])′(B)
P〈θ,γ〉
(
θ ∈ ΘˆB′ (X)
)
=
∑
B′∈B([0,1])′(B)
λ (B′) = λ (B)
for all B ∈ B ([0, 1]), θ ∈ Θ and γ ∈ Γ, thereby proving the rst half of the lemma. The onverse
follows from Lemma 2 and the fat that equation (2) is a speial ase of equation (8).
Equation (8) says the level of any partiular set estimator is equal to the atual overage rate
of that set estimator. Hene, the probability that ϑ is in a partiular estimated set is equal to the
overage rate of the orresponding set estimator:
Theorem 10. Suppose there are some indiator estimator 1ˆ on B×Ω and some signiane funtion
F suh that, for all Θ′ ∈ B and x ∈ Ω,
1ˆΘ′ (x) = P
x (ϑ ∈ Θ′) , (9)
where ϑ is a random quantity of measure P x, the ondene measure of θ given X = x that
orresponds to F. Let Θˆ : B ([0, 1])×Ω→ B denote any invertible set estimator orresponding to 1ˆ.
Then
P x
(
ϑ ∈ ΘˆB (x)
)
= λ (B) = P〈θ,γ〉
(
θ ∈ ΘˆB (X)
)
(10)
for all x ∈ Ω, B ∈ B ([0, 1]), θ ∈ Θ and γ ∈ Γ. Conversely, if there is an invertible set estimator
Θˆ : B ([0, 1]) × Ω → B orresponding to an indiator estimator 1ˆ on B × Ω suh that λ (B) =
P〈θ,γ〉
(
θ ∈ ΘˆB (X)
)
for all B ∈ B ([0, 1]), θ ∈ Θ, and γ ∈ Γ, then there is some signiane funtion
F and some ondene measure of θ given X = x that orresponds to F suh that equations (9)
and (10) hold for all x ∈ Ω, B ∈ B ([0, 1]), θ ∈ Θ and γ ∈ Γ.
Proof. By Lemma 4, equation (10) holds for all interval elements of B ([0, 1]) . That result for
intervals is extended to all unions of disjoint intervals in B ([0, 1]) by the invertibility as used in the
proof of Lemma 9, thereby proving the rst half of the theorem. The onverse follows diretly from
Lemmas 9 and 5.
Suintly generalizing equation (10) to θ as a vetor parameter of interest, Polansky (2007, pp.
4-5, 69, 224-227) dened rather than derived P x (Θ′) , the attained ondene level of θ ∈ Θ′, to
be the overage frequeny of a orresponding ondene set Θˆρ,ω (X) :
P x (Θ′) = ρ = P〈θ,γ〉
(
θ ∈ Θˆρ,ω(ρ) (X)
)
, (11)
where the overage rate ρ and shape parameter ω (ρ) are onstrained suh that Θˆρ,ω(ρ) (x) = Θ
′
for
the observed value x of random element X, the distribution P〈θ,γ〉 of whih is indexed by parameter
(〈θ, γ〉) . The observed ondene level (Polansky, 2007) of equation (11) should not be onfused
with theories of estimating ondene levels (Kiefer, 1977a; Goutis and Casella, 1995).
2.2 Axiomati oherene
Eah of the next two subsetions establishes the oherene of the ertainty distribution P x from a
distint viewpoint that led to axioms of oherene or rationality. The rst perspetive is deision-
theoreti and the seond is logi-theoreti.
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2.2.1 Axiomati deision theory
Preursors to axiomati deision theory The use of the ertainty distribution for deision
making was motivated in Setion 2.3 by plaing the deision-making agent in the role of a asino that
will settle bets at its published betting odds, allowing a gambling opponent to hoose hypotheses
on whih to bet. This represents situations in whih an agent must make a denite deision on the
basis of limited information, as when it must either aept the hypothesis that the true parameter
value is a pre-speied interval or aept the hypothesis that is is in the omplement of that interval.
That is essentially the gambling senario for whih Ramsay and de Finetti onsidered this Duth
book situation: a gambler an ontrat bets with any asino agent that assesses betting odds for
ertain events in violation of probability theory suh that the agent will lose regardless of the
outomes (Gillies, 2000, pp. 59-65). An agent or indiator estimator 1ˆ is alled oherent if it
assigns betting odds in suh a way that it will not suer suh sure loss. Shervish (1995) presents
the equivalent mathematial denition of oherene to whih the following proposition refers.
Proposition 11. Let M be the olletion of all measurable maps from a measurable spae (Ω,Σ)
to (Θ,B). An indiator estimator 1ˆ on B×Ξ is oherent if and only if there is a probability measure
P on (Ω,Σ) suh that 1ˆΘ′ (x) = P (ϑ ∈ Θ′) for all ϑ ∈ M and Θ′ ∈ B.
Proof. This follows immediately from Shervish (1995, Theorem B.139), who uses notation and
terminology loser to that of de Finetti (1970).
The denition of onditional probability has been reovered by a similar theorem based on bets
that are alled o if some event does not our; see, e.g., Shervish (1995, pp. 657-658) or Haking
(2001). In an idealized framework, setting onditional betting rates by any parameter distribution
other than a onditional probability distribution leads to ertain loss (Freedman and Purves, 1969;
Corneld, 1969; Buehler, 1977; Heath and Sudderth, 1978, 1989). Sine the probabilities in the the-
orems provided have no time dependene, they do not indiate the method of replaing a parameter
distribution after new data are observed and thus are ompatible with the proposed method of re-
plaement by maintaining orret ondene interval overage rates (2.3.2). In Bayesian inferene,
on the other hand, the parameter distribution used to plae bets after observing data is identied
with the prior distribution onditional on the observed data. Suh identiation is an assumption
that is usually hidden, not a onsequene of oherene (Bikel, 2009).
There are known problems with resting oherene on Duth book theorems alone (Levi, 2002;
Howson, 2009). De Finetti admitted that arguments from betting behavior do not provide an
unobjetionable foundation for oherent deision making (Gillies, 2000). Ramsay also looked beyond
the Duth book argument, speulating that an axiomati foundation enompassing both utility and
probability ould be laid (Frenh, 2000, p. 30). Savage (1954) proved the onjeture by drawing on
the game theory oneived in mathematial eonomis, and others have sine reated generalizations
of his axiomati deision theory (Frenh, 2000).
Axiomati deision theory proper Although axiomati systems of deision theory were de-
veloped with subjetive probability in mind, nothing in the mathematis prohibits more objetive
appliations by interpreting hypothesis probabilities as indiator estimates rather than as levels of
belief. In fat, the axioms only put very weak onstraints on rational deision-making that lead
to oherently representing unknown values as random quantities without requiring the additional
onstraints of a prior distribution and the harateristially Bayesian use of onditional probabil-
ity. In plae of the latter onstraints, the proposed framework substitutes the requirement that
probabilities orrespond to frequentist rates of overage.
While speifying a partiular utility funtion for use with the axioms is inherently subjetive,
it is no more so than speifying a partiular loss funtion for use in lassial frequentist deision
theory or a partiular signiane or ondene level for use in Neyman-Pearson theory. In order
to objetively ommuniate the results of data analysis, probability distributions of parameters an
be reported without utilities, as is ommon Bayesian pratie. Aordingly, reporting a ertainty
distribution of a parameter allows eah agent to supply its own loss funtion when making deisions
on the basis of what an be inferred about the parameter value from the available data.
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2.2.2 Axiomati indutive logi
While the axiomati deision theories, building on foundations laid by Bayes (Jereys, 1948, 1.3),
Ramsay, and de Finetti, derive probability from the maximization of expeted utility rather than
vie versa (2.2.1), many have questioned the propriety of the order (e.g., Kardaun et al., 2003).
That order was reversed by Keynes (1921), Jereys (1948), Cox (1946; 1961), Good (1950), and
Joye (1998), who onstruted axiomati formulations of indutive-logial probability on parameter
spae without relying on betting behavior, expeted gain, or other deision-theoreti onepts.
The term logial probability is used here in the broad sense of mathematial probability inter-
preted aording to any axiomati system that generalizes some logi of dedution. Beause suh
systems have been losely assoiated with some version of the now disredited priniple of insu-
ient reason (Franklin, 2001; Gillies, 2000, p. 64), the statistial ommunity has not deemed them
a pratial guide for data analysis. Logial probability may prove more useful in pratie when
supplemented instead with a frequentist priniple suh as one of minimizing arbitrary-hypothesis
risk (13).
The system of Cox (1946; 1961), while laking mathematial rigor, remains highly regarded its
simpliity and for the generality of its assumptions (e.g., Paris, 1994; Franklin, 2001; Van Horn,
2003; Howson, 2009) and ontinues to onvine sientists to express unertainty probabilistially
(e.g., Habek et al., 2005). Its two axioms may be expressed in the notation of Setion 2.3 with
the addition of joint and onditional indiator estimators 1ˆ in the seond axiom (Cox, 1961, pp.
3-4):
1. 1ˆΘ\Θ′ (x) is a smooth funtion of 1ˆΘ′ (x) for all x ∈ Ξ and Θ
′ ⊆ Θ.
2. 1ˆΘ′,Θ′′ (x), the estimate of 1Θ′ (θ)∧1Θ′′ (θ) , is a smooth funtion of 1ˆΘ′ (x) and of 1ˆΘ′′ (x|θ ∈ Θ′),
the onditional estimate of 1Θ′′ (θ) given θ ∈ Θ′, for all x ∈ Ξ, ∅ ⊂ Θ′ ⊆ Θ, and Θ′′ ⊆ Θ.
From more general versions of those stated axioms, a few tait assumptions, and the rules of lassial
logi, Cox (1961) proved 1ˆ to be isomorphi to nitely additive probability (Paris, 1994; Van Horn,
2003; Howson, 2009), allowing identiation with the ertainty distribution (15) as well as with the
Bayesian posterior that Cox originally had in mind.
2.3 Game-theoreti interpretation
2.3.1 Deisions as bets on hypotheses
Caution is needed when drawing general onlusions from the losses suered by gambling agents
sine suh onlusions an be sensitive to the rules of the game (Fraser, 1977). Further, some games
resemble situations faed in pratie better than others. By onstrution, inferene aording to
the proposed methodology is robust aross two games so dierent that eah had been used to argue
for an opposite paradigm of statistis:
1. Kempthorne (1976) and Kiefer (1977b) alluded to a game like that of Setion 2.3 to support
Neyman-Pearson statistis;
2. The game of posting fair betting odds for and against every hypothesis in some σ-eld is the
foundation of the traditional Duth-book argument for Bayesian statistis. See J. K. Ghosh
(2006, Appendix C) for an aessible summary of Shervish (1995, pp. 654-655), who furnishes
a more general theorem.
2.3.2 Arbitrary-hypothesis minimaxity
While pure Neyman-Pearson inferene is optimal under a risk funtion that in eet imposes an
innite penalty for failing to ontrol a Type I error rate at some speied level, suh a risk funtion
does not provide a helpful representation of all situations faed by the statistiian. Many situ-
ations that all for data-based deisions are better represented by a risk funtion representing a
statistiian's neessity to give odds for the hypothesis that an observed ondene interval overs
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the parameter of interest suh that a deision maker an use those odds to safely bet either for or
against that hypothesis as direted by an opponent (Corneld, 1969); this game gives struture to
the laims of Kempthorne (1976) and Kiefer (1977b) that were mentioned in Setion 1.3.
That risk funtion is extended to aommodate more general hypothesis testing via the following
zero-sum game played between a statistiian and a lient. The lient will speify a pair of mutually
exlusive and jointly exhaustive hypotheses to whih the statistiian must assign betting odds.
Those odds determine the amount of either a payo or penalty for the statistiian, depending on
whih hypothesis is true.
This situation is further stylized by representing the deision-making statistiian as a asino
agent and the opposing lient as a gambler at the asino. The statistiian applies a omprehensive
olletion of set estimators to data and, for eah level-ρ set estimate, posts ρ/ (1− ρ) as fair betting
odds for the event that the set estimate inludes θ to the event that the set estimate does not
inlude θ. The set is omprehensive in the sense that its elements map to all elements of B for eah
x ∈ Ω. In posting fair betting odds, the statistiian announes a willingness ommit to paying the
lient ρ or less if the set estimate does not inlude θ provided that 1− ρ or more would instead be
reeived from the lient if the set estimate inludes θ. The statistiian also must swap the payment
amounts to bet that the set estimate does not inlude θ if the lient desires. The lient only
aepts bet proposals at the odds the statistiian onsiders fair, not favorable. Further, knowing
the distributions of the set estimators in the statistiian's set, the lient will not aept unfavorable
bets, that is, bets with negative risk to the statistiian. The lient enfores this by omputing ω,
the truly fair betting odds as dened by the ratio of the rate at whih sets from the statistiian
over θ to the rate of its non-overage. The lient then ompares the fair betting odds to ρ/ (1− ρ)
when deiding whether to aept a bet at odds ρ/ (1− ρ). Thus, the statistiian only suessfully
ontrats a bet on overage if ρ/ (1− ρ) ≥ ω or on non-overage if ρ/ (1− ρ) ≤ ω. This ontrat is
onisely represented in terms of loss suered by the statistiian:
LB
(
Θˆ;X
)
=


ρ1Θ\ΘˆB(X) (θ)− (1− ρ) 1ΘˆB(X) (θ) , ρ/ (1− ρ) > ω (B)
(1− ρ) 1ΘˆB(X) (θ)− ρ1Θ\ΘˆB(X) (θ) , ρ/ (1− ρ) < ω (B)
0, ρ/ (1− ρ) = ω (B) ,
where B ∈ B ([0, 1]) , ρ = λ (B) , and Θˆ is an invertible set estimator mapping B ([0, 1]) × Ω to B
and orresponding to some indiator estimator 1ˆ on B × Ω; the fair betting odds of θ ∈ ΘˆB (X) to
θ /∈ ΘˆB (X) are given by
ω (B) = ω〈θ,γ〉 (B) =
P〈θ,γ〉
(
θ ∈ ΘˆB (X)
)
P〈θ,γ〉
(
θ /∈ ΘˆB (X)
) , (12)
resulting in the risk the statistiian assumes by relying on 1ˆ for assessing the odds of an arbitrary
hypothesis.
Denition 12. ConsiderD
(
1ˆ
)
, the olletion of all invertible set estimators eah mapping B ([0, 1])×
Ω to B and orresponding to some indiator estimator 1ˆ on B×Ω. The arbitrary-hypothesis risk of
1ˆ is
R〈θ,γ〉
(
1ˆ
)
= minΘˆ∈D(1ˆ) maxB∈B([0,1]) E〈θ,γ〉
(
LB
(
Θˆ;X
))
(13)
for all θ ∈ Θ and γ ∈ Γ.
As in Neyman-Pearson testing, the hypotheses to be assessed are arbitrary in the sense that
they are ditated by the needs of the urrent appliation and are thus outside of the agent's ontrol.
Additional arbitrary hypotheses may also be speied in the future for unforeseen appliations. For
the purpose of dening the risk assoiated with the indiator estimator 1ˆ used to assess an arbitrary
hypothesis, the worst-ase speiation of a hypothesis orresponds to the least-favorable seletion
of the orresponding set estimator ΘˆB. Derivation of a testing proedure from a set estimator
rather than vie versa is not without preedent (Shee, 1977; Liu, 1997; Efron and Tibshirani,
1998; Gleser, 2002).
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Lemma 13. The indiator estimator 1ˆ on B × Ω is minimax to arbitrary-hypothesis risk if and
only if there is an invertible set estimator Θˆ : B ([0, 1])× Ω→ B orresponding to 1ˆ suh that
P〈θ,γ〉
(
θ ∈ ΘˆB (X)
)
= λ (B) (14)
for all B ∈ B ([0, 1]) , θ ∈ Θ, and γ ∈ Γ.
Proof. An indiator estimator 1ˆ is minimax to arbitrary-hypothesis risk if and only if it minimizes
maxθ∈Θ,γ∈ΓR〈θ,γ〉
(
1ˆ
)
(Denition 12). Given a partiular set estimator ΘˆB for any B ∈ B ([0, 1]) ,
the odds for θ ∈ ΘˆB are λ (B) / (1− λ (B)) as assessed by 1ˆ. If equation (14) holds, those odds
are equal to ω (B), the true odds given by equation (12), and thus E〈θ,γ〉
(
LB
(
Θˆ;X
))
= 0 for
all B ∈ B ([0, 1]) , θ ∈ Θ, and γ ∈ Γ. Therefore, maxθ∈Θ,γ∈ΓR〈θ,γ〉
(
1ˆ
)
= 0. But if equation
(14) does not hold, then λ (B) / (1− λ (B)) 6= ω (B). If ∃B ∈ B ([0, 1]) , θ ∈ Θ, γ ∈ Γ suh that
λ (B) / (1− λ (B)) > ω (B) , then
E〈θ,γ〉
(
LB
(
Θˆ;X
))
= λ (B)P〈θ,γ〉
(
θ /∈ ΘˆB (X)
)
− (1− λ (B))P〈θ,γ〉
(
θ ∈ ΘˆB (X)
)
E〈θ,γ〉
(
LB
(
Θˆ;X
))
(1− λ (B))P〈θ,γ〉
(
θ /∈ ΘˆB (X)
) = λ (B)
1− λ (B)
− ω (B) > 0.
Likewise, if ∃B ∈ B ([0, 1]) , θ ∈ Θ, γ ∈ Γ suh that λ (B) / (1− λ (B)) < ω (B) , then
E〈θ,γ〉
(
LB
(
Θˆ;X
))
(1− λ (B))P〈θ,γ〉
(
θ /∈ ΘˆB (X)
) = ω (B)− λ (B)
1− λ (B)
> 0
for all θ ∈ Θ, γ ∈ Γ. Both results together indiate that if there is any B in B ([0, 1]) suh that
equation (14) does not hold for any θ ∈ Θ, γ ∈ Γ, then maxθ∈Θ,γ∈ΓR〈θ,γ〉
(
1ˆ
)
> 0.
That lemma leads to the orollary of Theorem 10 that establishes the unique minimaxity of the
ondene measure.
Corollary 14. The indiator estimator 1ˆ on B × Ω is minimax to arbitrary-hypothesis risk if and
only if there is some signiane funtion F suh that, for all Θ′ ∈ B and x ∈ Ω,
1ˆΘ′ (x) = P
x (ϑ ∈ Θ′) , (15)
where ϑ is a random quantity of law P x, the ondene measure of θ that orresponds to F given
X = x.
Proof. By Lemma 13, this orollary obtains if and only if exat overage (14) holds for every
partiular set estimator ΘˆB orresponding to the indiator estimator 1ˆ given by equation (15).
Theorem 10 supplies the neessary and suient onditions.
Remark 15. The onditions of Theorem 10 and Corollary 14 inlude ontinuous data and exat
satisfation of the uniformity ondition for brevity and larity. Appliations to atual data often
require judiious approximations. For example, a half-orretion makes the signiane funtion
appliable to disrete data (Shweder and Hjort, 2002). As an alternative to approximate ondene
measures, upper and lower probabilities onstituting envelopes of a lass of ondene measures
have been proposed (Bikel, 2009) in the spirit of the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief funtions
(Dempster, 2008). In that ase, methods of ombining ondene measures (3.2; Singh et al.,
2005) would apply separately to eah ondene measure of the lass.
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3 Inorporation of previous information
3.1 Subjetive ondene measures
Consider a set A of agents, a set T of Ω-measurable maps, and a funtion t• : A → T . The random
quantity ta (X) represents relevant information aessible to any agent a ∈ A or what that agent
an reall from previous experiene. The information is subjetive in the sense that
ta′ (x) 6= ta′′ (x) , a
′, a′′ ∈ A
is possible for the same observed data x ∈ Ω. Errors in agent pereption or memory ould be
modeled by, for eah a ∈ A, modeling ta as the realization of a random funtion Ta, e.g., yielding
Ta (X) = 〈X1 + Y (a) , X2 + Y (a) , . . . , Xn + Y (a)〉 ,
where Y (a) is some random variable independent of Xi. Likewise, agents themselves may be ran-
domly seleted from A, in whih ase A represents a random agent.
For generality, Pθ,γ will represent a joint probability measure extended from P〈θ,γ〉 suh that
Pθ,γ (X = •) is the distribution of the data on whih eah agent indiretly relies, Pθ,γ (A = •) is
the distribution of agents, and Pθ,γ (T = •) is the distribution of maps from Ω to T . The trivial
assignments Pθ,γ (A = a) = 1 and Pθ,γ (T = t) = 1 are important speial ases. If there is a
funtion G : T ×Θ→ [0, 1] suh that
Pθ,γ
(
GTA(X) (θ) < α
)
= α (16)
for all θ ∈ Θ, γ ∈ Γ, and α ∈ [0, 1] , then G is a signiane funtion by Denition 1. Let Q〈x,a,t〉
denote the ondene measure of θ that orresponds to G given 〈X,A, T 〉 = 〈x, a, t〉. Beause G and
Q〈x,a,t〉 depend on subjetive information in the form of TA, they are alled a subjetive signiane
funtion and a subjetive ondene measure, respetively. By ontrast, a ondene measure that
does not depend on suh subjetive information is alled objetive.
3.2 Updating a subjetive ondene measure
3.2.1 Combining subjetive and objetive measures
Subjetive Bayesianism makes use of agent knowledge by deriving the prior distribution of the
parameters onditional on the data. The result is the Bayes posterior distribution of the parameters,
from whih a marginal posterior distribution of the parameter of interest may be obtained. The
proposed substitute for this appliation of Bayes's theorem is the ombination of the subjetive
ondene measure with the objetive ondene measure by generating a new ondene measure.
Due to the isomorphism between ondene measures and signiane funtions (1.1), any of
the methods of ombining signiane funtions studied by Singh et al. (2005) is equivalent to
ombining their orresponding ondene measures. Thus, I propose that suh methods be used
to ombine subjetive and objetive ondene measures by ombining their signiane funtions
into a single signiane funtion orresponding to a ombined ondene measure.
Example 16. Singh et al. (2005) proposed a method of signiane funtion ombination that
relies on the hoie of a ontinuous umulative distribution funtion. Out of several suh funtions
onsidered, DE, the umulative distribution funtion of the double exponential distribution, per-
forms the best under repeated sampling, espeially for small sample sizes (Singh et al., 2005), when
the onsideration of agent opinion has the most impat. For this funtion, the signiane fun-
tion F, and L independent samples X (1) , X (2) , ..., X (L) eah drawn from P〈θ,γ〉, the ombined
signiane funtion F˜ is dened suh that
F˜ (θ) = DEL
(
DE−1
(
FX(1) (θ)
)
+DE−1
(
FX(2) (θ)
)
+ · · ·+DE−1
(
FX(L) (θ)
))
(17)
for all θ ∈ Θ, DEL (q) is the onvolution of L opies of DE (q) , and
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DE−1 (p) = log (2p) I
with I as the indiator funtion. Singh et al. (2005) found that the onvolution may be omputed
from VL (q) , a polynomial that satises a simple reursive relation, using
DEL (q) =
(
1−
1
2eq
VL (q)
)
I[0,∞) (q) +
1
2e−q
VL (−q) I(−∞,0] (q) .
The most ommonly used polynomials are V1 (q) = 1, V2 (q) = 1 +
q
2 , and V3 (q) = 1 +
5q+q2
8 .
A ondene measure formed by ombining both objetive and subjetive ondene measures
will be alled an agent-updated ondene measure. Suh formation will be referred to as agent-based
ondene updating (ABCU).
3.2.2 Reduing sensitivity to violations of mathing
Sine the distribution of Ta is typially unknown, an available subjetive distribution is at best
an approximation to a ondene measure. Combining subjetive distributions with objetive
ondene measures an be made more robust to the inuene of a subjetive distribution's deviation
from the properties of a ondene measure by treating a subjetive distribution as if it were an
objetive ondene measure based on an inorret model. In eet, a ondene measure derived
from an inorret model or from a misleading agent opinion is not a ondene measure of the true
parameter value, but of some other underlying parameter value. Methods of adaptive ondene-
measure ombination assign weights suh that a ombination of ondene measures with dierent
underlying parameter values asymptotially has the properties of a ondene measure with respet
to the true parameter value (Singh et al., 2005). Thus the value of the asymptoti ombined
ondene measure, when evaluated at the true value of the parameter, has the uniform distribution
(1) needed.
3.2.3 Multiple sampling distributions
Condene-measure ombination applies independent samples drawn from dierent populations as
well as to independent samples drawn from the same population. The following example illustrates
this.
Example 17. A standard ommon-mean problem involves estimating a mean θ shared by two
or more normal populations of unknown varianes that may dier from one population to an-
other. Condene measure ombination using equation (17) yielded 95% ondene intervals
with lose to 95% overage for simulated data drawn from two normal populations of θ = 1
for various hoies of sample sizes and population varianes (Singh et al., 2005). For one suh
hoie, samples of sizes 3 and 4 were drawn from populations of variane 1 and 3.52, respetively.
For this illustration, those populations generated the realizations y1 = (0.523, 2.460, 1.119) and
y2 = (0.072,−2.275,−4.554,−0.077), two observed samples with means (x¯1, x¯2) and standard de-
viations (s1, s2). Their ombined ondene measure F˜ then gives
F˜ (θ) = DE2
aording to equation (17). Sine the sample sizes are small, any agent knowledge may play an
inuential role in inferene about the mean. Given that the subjetive distributions on θ for two
independent agents are N
(
0, 32
)
and N
(
2, 42
)
, the agent-updated ondene measure gives
F˜a (θ) = DE4,
where Φ (q) is the standard normal umulative distribution funtion. F˜a (θ) is a ondene measure
under the assumption of a mathing agent spae. The eet of inluding agent opinion may be
quantied by noting, e.g., the impat on the p-value of H0 : θtrue = −1 versus Ha : θtrue > −1;
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F˜ (−1) ≈ 0.104, whereas F˜a (−1) ≈ 0.049. Like in the ase of suitably assigned prior probabilities,
the eet of inorporating agent knowledge disappears as either sample size goes to innity.
Writing from a Bayesian perspetive, Seidenfeld (2007) hallenged frequentism with a ommon-
mean problem in the guise of the inferring the mass of a hollow ube from a diret measurement of
the mass of the ube and a measurement of the mass of a ruler of known density. In what is arguably
the most mature logial system of diret inferene, the onsideration of both measurements leads
to a loss of preision ompared to onsideration of either measurement alone (Kyburg, 2007). By
ontrast, ondene-measure ombination enables the eetive use not only of information in both
measurements but also of any subjetive information, as in Example 17.
3.3 Assignment of subjetive ondene
This setion outlines three general methods of assigning a subjetive ondene measure.
However, it is not always neessary to obtain an entire ondene measure. For example, one
subjetive p-value sues to obtain the agent-based p-value with respet to a single null hypothesis.
3.3.1 Hypothetial-data ondene assignment
One way to assign a Bayesian prior is to have the agent generate a hypothetial data set on whih
its knowledge about θ is based; see, e.g., Lele (2004). Likewise, using equation (16), a subjetive
ondene measureQ〈x,a,t〉 an be derived from the hypothetial data x on whih agent amight have
based its opinion. For that alulation, t either may be an identity funtion suh that t (x) = x and
Pθ,γ (T = t) = 1 or may alibrate the data assignment to orret an eliitation bias. The tehnique
will be illustrated with a simple example of generating hypothetial data to generate a subjetive
likelihood ratio.
Example 18. Edwards (1992), making use of the likelihood priniple without relying on prior dis-
tributions, suggested the use of subjetive likelihood ratios under the paradigm in whih inferene is
made diretly from the atual likelihood funtion rather than from a posterior distribution derived
from it or from likelihood funtions based on unobserved data. His Example 3.5.1 supposes the
knowledge of Torrielli regarding the atmospheri pressure µ, prior to his taking measurements, is
equivalent to the knowledge that would be gained by drawing 740 mmHg from a normal distribu-
tion of unknown mean µ and known standard deviation 25 mmHg. Then, up to a proportionality
onstant, the subjetive likelihood is exp
(
− 12
(
740−µ
25
)2)
, whereas the likelihood from his measure-
ment, 760 mmHg, is exp
(
− 12
(
760−µ
1
)2)
sine the sampling distribution is assumed normal with
standard deviation 1 mmHg. Multiplying the two likelihood funtions yields the likelihood funtion
used for inferene; its maximum ours at µ = 759.968 mmHg (Edwards, 1992).
The same method an generate a subjetive ondene measure.
Example 19. In the problem of Example 18, the subjetive and objetive likelihood funtions are
proportional to the densities of the subjetive and objetive ondene measures if Pθ,γ (A = a) = 1
and Pθ,γ (T = t) = 1, where t is an identity funtion. Using equation ((17)), the density of the
agent-updated ondene measure reahes its maximum at µ = 759.231 mmHg.
3.3.2 Diret ondene assignment
Like Bruno de Finetti's prior probability of a hypothesis, the subjetive ondene of a hypothesis
an be dened as the pereived value of the opportunity to gain one unit of utility if the hypothesis
is true. In other words, both the Bayesian subjetive probability and the subjetive ondene level
are betting quotients that determine the deisions of some agent.
While Bayesian prior probability is onstrained only by oherene, ondene levels are also
onstrained by the rules of the game desribed in Setion 2.3, modied as follows. In reporting set
estimators to the lient asino, the statistiian agent a annot use the data X but rather redued
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data ta (X) dened by some Ω-measurable map ta. A set estimator ΘˆB is only available to the agent
if there is some funtion Θ† suh that
ΘˆB (x) = Θˆ
†
B (ta (x)) (18)
for all B ∈ B ([0, 1]) , x ∈ Ω. The agent will ahieve minimaxity under arbitrary-hypothesis loss if
and only if the set estimates made on the basis of its hoies of Θˆ†Bs are isomorphi to ondene
measures. With the set estimators seleted by the agent under restrition (18), eah ondene
measure Q〈x,a,t〉 is that agent's subjetive ondene measure on the basis of information t (x) ,
where t = T if T is a xed funtion or t is a realization of T if T is a random funtion.
As in Bayesian statistis, subjetive distributions need not be onstruted by a formal proess
of eliiting the atual beliefs of a human individual or organization. Nonetheless, the denition
of subjetive ondene in terms of an agent's betting rate serves as a guiding priniple for the
speiation of subjetive ondene measures.
The foundational idea of this frequentist methodology may be motivated by the orresponding
Bayesian methodology. From an idealized Bayesian standpoint, inasmuh as an agent's eliited
opinion has been oherently formulated from observed data suh as summaries of data more di-
retly observed by others, the agent's prior will equal the posterior distribution that would have
been obtained by applying Bayes's theorem to the former data were they still available. Similarly,
sine under frequentism a set of p-values or ondene intervals takes the plae of the posterior
distribution as the inferene result, one may onsider eliiting p-values or ondene intervals from
an agent that, in the ideal ase, equal that would have been omputed given the now unavailable
data on whih the agent opinion was based. Then, in analogy with how the Bayesian ombines a
subjetive prior distribution with a likelihood funtion obtained from data, the frequentist may use
ondene-measure ombination to ombine subjetive p-values and ondene intervals with those
obtained from data. The ondene measure provides a framework for suh ombination by enap-
sulating the information of p-values and ondene intervals into a ondene measure. Informally,
given a sample of xed observations, the umulative distribution funtion of the standard ondene
measure maps eah null hypothesis parameter value to its upper-tailed p-value. Likewise, given a
xed eliitation of an agent's opinion, the umulative distribution funtion of the subjetive on-
dene measure maps eah null hypothesis parameter value to the upper-tailed p-value assigned by
the agent. Alternatively, the agent's subjetive distribution may be approximated by interpolating
the lower-tailed p-values provided at a suient number of null hypothesis parameter values or by
interpolating the ondene intervals provided at a suient number of ondene levels. To the
extent that eah randomly seleted agent's knowledge is orretly summarized in suh a subjetive
distribution, one-sided p-values derived from those priors follow a uniform distribution under the
truth of the null hypothesis.
3.3.3 Bayesian ondene assignment
Due to the novelty of assigning subjetive ondene diretly, the guidane provided in Setion
3.3.2 might be less reliable in the ase of a human agent than the appliation of mature proedures
of eliiting Bayesian prior distributions and of orreting them to ensure oherene. For examples,
see Chaloner (1996), Craig et al. (1998), and Garthwaite et al. (2005).
If a Bayesian prior eliited from an agent equals a Bayesian posterior omputed from a probability-
mathing initial distribution (Datta and Mukerjee, 2004) and the data on whih the agent indiretly
based its prior, then the prior asymptotially approahes a ondene measure; see Singh et al.
(2005) on asymptoti signiane funtions. In this sense, a Bayesian prior is approximately equal
to a subjetive ondene measure suitable for ombination with an objetive ondene measure.
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Objetive input only Subjetive input inluded
Frequentist alu-
lations
Objetive ondene measures or
ombinations thereof are used for
inferene
Combinations of objetive and
subjetive ondene measures
are used for inferene
Bayesian alula-
tions
Starting with an improper prior
distribution, the resulting poste-
rior distribution is used for infer-
ene
Starting with an agent's proper
prior distribution, the resulting
posterior distribution is used for
inferene
Table 1: Comparison of subjetive Bayesianism and the proposed subjetive frequentism (the agent-
updated ondene measure) to their ounterparts that do not formally rely on agent knowledge.
4 Disussion
4.1 Reliability of ondene measures
The reliability of P x in the form of ondene mathing (Theorem 10) and arbitrary-hypothesis
minimaxity (Corollary 14) means the deision-making agent annot suer any expeted loss due
to a strategy of plaing bets over repeated samples in the above game-theoreti framework. Con-
sequently, if the game were modied suh that at least some of the bets plaed are favorable, the
agent would arue an expeted gain. However, the benet of ahieving minimax risk and the stated
rates of interval overage is not limited to those rare or non-existent situations in whih more than
one sample is drawn from the same population; rather, those properties reet the reliability of
methods satisfying them.
4.2 Other approahes to subjetive information
4.2.1 Objetive and subjetive Bayes
Considering ABCU as subjetive frequentism eluidates its relationship to standard Bayesian ap-
proahes (Table 1). The omparison involves some blurring between Bayesianism and frequentism,
as posterior distributions with probability-mathing priors are approximate ondene measures.
This suggests that the hoie of whether or not to inorporate agent knowledge may often tend
to have more impat on inferene than the hoie of whether to perform Bayesian or frequentist
alulations.
Whereas appliation of the agent-updated ondene measure is only based on previous infor-
mation about a one-dimensional parameter of interest, a subjetive Bayesian analysis an also make
use of any information that is also available for the nuisane parameters, often leading to more reli-
able inferene. However, even when agents do have suh information, it is only rarely eliited, and,
in pratie, improper priors tend to be put on the vast majority of nuisane parameters (Berger,
2004). That the agent-updated ondene measure requires the eliitation of information on only
one salar parameter may enable researhers to inorporate at least some subjetive knowledge into
their analyses.
4.2.2 Previous non-Bayesian approahes
ABCU is not the only non-Bayesian framework available for use of subjetive information about
the salar parameter of interest. Example 18 illustrates suh use in the diret-likelihood framework
further developed by Royall (1997). The likelihood priniple of that framework is not followed by
Neyman-Pearson uses of subjetive likelihood, also alled a likelihood penalty (Shweder and Hjort,
2002).
Perhaps those previous non-Bayesian methods of inorporating agent knowledge are seldom
used beause they require eliitation of likelihood ratios, whih, as Royall (2000) oneded, are
understood by few sientists. If so, then methods requiring only the eliitation of either a p-value
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or of a few ondene intervals, as guided by one of the methods of Setion 3.3, may have wider
appeal.
Also obviating the eliitation of a likelihood funtion, Fraser and Reid (2002) onsider assigning
a subjetive prior to a salar parameter of interest in the loation parameterization. To the extent
that its treatment of nuisane parameters approximates the assignment of diuse priors to suh
parameters, this approah will give results similar to those of the more lassial Bayesian approah.
However, the reparameterization approah is better understood on its own terms: applying Bayes's
theorem to a uniform prior in the loation parameterization yields a posterior that mathes fre-
quentist ondene intervals (Fraser and Reid, 2002), i.e., the Bayesian posterior is a ondene
measure. That other priors in general bring departures from this mathing property distinguishes
this method from ABCU. This does not neessarily indiate the superiority of the latter, as the
preservation of mathing probability even under the use of subjetive information omes in exhange
for inferene additivity, an issue addressed below.
More generally, one may multiply the probability density funtion of a mathing prior by a
likelihood or pseudo-likelihood that is only a funtion of the salar interest parameter, yielding,
after normalization, a posterior distribution for inferene. Following Shweder and Hjort (2002),
suh a likelihood or pseudo-likelihood funtion is onsidered redued sine, unlike the full likelihood
funtion, it does not depend on the nuisane parameters. If this redued likelihood is proportional
to the density funtion of the objetive ondene measure, then the posterior probability will equal
the normalized produt of the density of the subjetive ondene measure and the density of the
objetive ondene measure. (Shweder and Hjort (2002) found that the proportionality property
holds for some redued likelihoods.) Under ertain onditions, that normalized produt asymptot-
ially approahes the ombined ondene measure found by equation ((17)) with the substitution
of the mathing prior distribution for a ondene measure. In general, however, diretly using that
equation leads to more exat ondene measures than those obtained by multiplying ondene
measure densities (Singh et al., 2005).
The priniple of inferene additivity mentioned above means the totality of inferenes resulting
from several analyses, eah based on dierent information, is idential to the inferene from the
single analysis based on simultaneous onsideration of all of the information; f. Edwards (1992).
The loss of inferene additivity is the most obvious drawbak of ABCU ompared to uses of Bayes's
theorem. In the ontext of agent-updated ondene measures, the way in whih three or more
ondene measures are ombined may aet the result, e.g., ombining the ombination of two
ondene measures with a third yields a ondene measure that is not neessarily equal to that of
the simultaneous ombination of all three. (The ombination of the objetive ondene measures
of Setion 3.2.3 with the ombination of both subjetive ondene measures results in a p-value
of 0.054 instead of the simultaneous-ombination p-value of 0.049.)
It has also been noted that inferene based on ondene measures, unlike that based on Bayesian
posterior distributions, violates the likelihood priniple (Shweder and Hjort, 2002). ABCU shares
this violation with other methods designed to have orret overage when agent opinion is not
inorporated.
It may be onluded that the optimality of one method over another will depend largely on
the availability of information from agents and on the relative desirability of eah of the inferene
priniples and frequentist properties. Both methods using generalized ondene measures share a
new way to formalize agent knowledge. The unique benet of ABCU is its prodution of probability
statements that are orret in the frequentist sense even after inorporating that knowledge.
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